Abstract
The language of bioethics occupies a middle ground of meaning. Within this median of dispute and uncertainty, and central to nearly all questions facing medicine and society, is the meaning of dignity. The language of human dignity in particular has been criticized as vague and, therefore, useless as an operational criterion by which to formulate pragmatic agendas. In response, proposals to eliminate the long-cherished moral principle of respecting human dignity bear a greater burden of proof than do appeals to sustain it. In defense of a provisional understanding of dignity, definitions that elude precision may be appropriate for a people who live in the middle. Temporally, bioethics concerns people who live in the midst of an unfolding history. Philosophically, the significance of moral principles and the accumulated consequences of decisions are not yet fully known. An as yet incomplete understanding of human dignity represents an opportunity for discovery, not simply in abstraction, but in community.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 7-12 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Ethics and Medicine |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - 2013 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Health Policy
- Philosophy
- Religious studies
Cite this
The middle word in bioethics. / Cheshire, William P.
In: Ethics and Medicine, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 7-12.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The middle word in bioethics
AU - Cheshire, William P.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - The language of bioethics occupies a middle ground of meaning. Within this median of dispute and uncertainty, and central to nearly all questions facing medicine and society, is the meaning of dignity. The language of human dignity in particular has been criticized as vague and, therefore, useless as an operational criterion by which to formulate pragmatic agendas. In response, proposals to eliminate the long-cherished moral principle of respecting human dignity bear a greater burden of proof than do appeals to sustain it. In defense of a provisional understanding of dignity, definitions that elude precision may be appropriate for a people who live in the middle. Temporally, bioethics concerns people who live in the midst of an unfolding history. Philosophically, the significance of moral principles and the accumulated consequences of decisions are not yet fully known. An as yet incomplete understanding of human dignity represents an opportunity for discovery, not simply in abstraction, but in community.
AB - The language of bioethics occupies a middle ground of meaning. Within this median of dispute and uncertainty, and central to nearly all questions facing medicine and society, is the meaning of dignity. The language of human dignity in particular has been criticized as vague and, therefore, useless as an operational criterion by which to formulate pragmatic agendas. In response, proposals to eliminate the long-cherished moral principle of respecting human dignity bear a greater burden of proof than do appeals to sustain it. In defense of a provisional understanding of dignity, definitions that elude precision may be appropriate for a people who live in the middle. Temporally, bioethics concerns people who live in the midst of an unfolding history. Philosophically, the significance of moral principles and the accumulated consequences of decisions are not yet fully known. An as yet incomplete understanding of human dignity represents an opportunity for discovery, not simply in abstraction, but in community.
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M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84874171163
VL - 29
SP - 7
EP - 12
JO - Ethics and Medicine
JF - Ethics and Medicine
SN - 0266-688X
IS - 1
ER -